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Over the past ten years, Nella Larsen
'
s 1929 novel  
Passing has become an important reference within
 contemporary debates over the status of racial differ-
 ence, especially those debates carried out by critics
 whose work interrogates the thresholds of biology
 and culture. For many of these readers, the novel
 contains strong suggestions that Larsen herself
 viewed "race” as an ontologically bankrupt term.
 Samira Kawash, for instance, regards passing narra
­tives such as Larsen
'
s as part of the project of “dislo ­
cating the color line,” insofar as the forms of social
 encounter these narratives enact — in which geno
­typically “black” characters are able to move freely
 through otherwise restrictive social spaces by virtue
 of their phenotypically “white” characteristics —
 “makes impossible and irrelevant appeals to authen
­ticity as a signal of ethnicity” (149). “Difference,”
 Kawash explains, “refers not to some reality... but
 
to  
positionality,” a fact that Passing should underscore.
 Working along a similar vein of thought, Robyn
 Wiegman points out that Passing enacts a “visible
 negation of
 
‘blackness’” and thus unsettles the “visible  
epistemology of black skin” to which traditional par
­adigms of American racism have been anchored.
 Larsen
'
s literary project, then, takes up an overt polit ­
ical agenda for such readers, since as Wiegman goes
 on to explain, “[t]o interrupt this equation [“between
 the idea of ‘race’ and the ‘black’ body”] is crucial to
 the political articulation of antiracist cultural cri
­tique” (21-2). At the very
 
least, Passing raises persis-
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tent questions concerning the efficacy of racial difference inasmuch as the nar
­
rative consistently returns to question the premises that ground our knowledge
 of such difference. When Larsen’s protagonist, Irene Redfield, 
is
asked to  
explain “the trick” of
 
distinguishing an “authentic” Caucasian from an individ ­
ual who merely passes as one — when, in short, she is asked to locate and give
 a name to that thing that makes all the difference between two phenotypically
 similar individuals — she can offer little more than the dubious reply: “There
 are ways. But they’re not definite or tangible” (Larsen 206). Pushed further,
 she adds, “Just — just something. A thing that couldn’t be registered.”
It is, of course, a statement that tends to mystify matters of racial differ
­
ence, and yet such mystification is what Passing cannot avoid, what Larsen
 seems forced to engage in a novel that removes “race” from the level of the phe
­notypical, the corporeal, the visible. Irene’s comment might in this sense seem
 to offer us a glimpse at Larsen’s true hand in Passing: doesn’t “a thing that
 couldn’t be registered,” the ambiguous “something” that purports to substanti
­ate racial difference, indicate that 
as
 soon as we begin to speak of racial ontol ­
ogy, we are already knee-deep in pure fantasy, pure projection — that, in short,
 the differences between whites and blacks are the differences they themselves
 inscribe and maintain? For her part, Kawash follows up on these possibilities
 when she suggests that Irene’s remark figures “race” as more “nothing” than
 “something,” more a cultural phantasm (like the mysterious “drop of black
 blood” that ostensibly condenses the world of difference between blacks and
 whites) than a substantive component of biological reality (155).
Such readings of Passing as a narrative project that disturbs essentialist for
­
mulations of racial difference, and hence challenges the racist economies these
 formulations authorize, draw upon a nuanced association between the pleasures
 of parody and the political effects of performance. In this sense, Judith Butler’s
 reading of Passing deserves special attention, since it was Butler’s earlier Gender
 Trouble that first articulated, in ways that resonated
 
widely among Anglophone  
cultural critics, the subversive properties of parodic performance. Butler con
­tends that parodic performances are inherently disruptive of the norms they
 mimic and, more particularly, that the disruptions at issue here disperse them
­selves through the vehicle of laughter. “The loss of the sense of ‘the normal,”’
 Butler explains, “can be its own occasion for laughter, especially when ‘the nor
­mal,’ ‘the original’ is revealed to be a copy, and an inevitably failed one, an ideal
 that no one can embody. In this sense, laughter emerges in the realization that
 all along the original was derived” (138-9). For Butler, parody and the laugh
­ter it incites tend to undermine the matrix of prescribed norms we typically
 experience as reality itself, inflicting a form of category crisis that is all
 
the more  
powerful because grounded in our sensation of unregulated pleasure.
This model of parodic subversion asserts itself throughout Butler’s later
 
reading of Passing, especially insofar as this reading
 
finds the tension of Larsen’s  
narrative at precisely that point where an understanding of “race” as a biologi
­cally sustained and impermeable boundary gives way to the performative
 process of passing, the effect of which 
is
 to submit every absolute racial demar ­
cation to the prospect of its own contingency and flux. In her reading of
 Larsen, Butler explains that “the uncertain border between black and white” —
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the very uncertain, Du Boisian 
"
color line” upon  which Irene fails to lay  hold as  
she gropes for this “thing that couldn’t be registered” — 
is
 precisely what racist  
essentialism must specify in order to maintain its fantasies of racial purity and
 hierarchy. For this reason, Butler suggests that passing’s implicit challenge to
 naturalistic categories of difference — more specifically, its displacement of
 such naturalistic categories with performative simulacra of these categories —
 presents a profound threat to racial essentialism and hence racism itself; for the
 latter, as Butler explains, it 
is
 “the spectre of a racial ambiguity that must be  
conquered,” that must be refused and effaced in order for the white-suprema
­cist mind to retain its own epistemological footing (Bodies 172). Thus, the risky
 pleasures to which passing yields access become strictly subordinate to the plea
­sures inherent to the form of passing itself, a form in which we witness the col
­lapse of “original” into "copy,” of “white” into “black.” In Larsen’s novel, Butler
 would suggest, racial ontology itself becomes 
a
 kind of joke, since Passing  
inspires laughter at the expense of those who cling to such an ontology, dis
­crediting
 
those particular criteria of corporeal difference to which  larger notions  
of racial differentiation are often attached.




into the racially  segregated Drayton tearoom, finds herself the  
object of an anonymous, apparently Caucasian gaze — when she succumbs to
 the fear that a nearby
 
Caucasian onlooker has discerned her legally marginalized  
racial status — her growing sense of dread is tempered by her sense of the
 ridiculousness of the situation. “Absurd!” she muses. “White people were so
 stupid about such things for all that they
 
usually asserted that they were able to  
tell; and by the most ridiculous means, finger-nails, palms of hands, shapes of
 ears, teeth, and other equally silly rot” (150). The prospect of discovery 
is
 dead ­
ly serious for Irene, and yet the whole sequence underlines the “absurd,” laugh
­able possibility that, precisely through its myopic fixation upon corporeal
 details that actually mean nothing whatsoever, the anonymous Caucasian gaze
 has effectively mistaken Irene for what she is. Thus, Larsen tells us, “Irene
 laughed softly, but her eyes flashed” (150). That the truth may sometimes arise
 from a misrecognition would be funny in itself, if not for Irene’s fear of being
 discovered and hence ejected from the Drayton tearoom, but the overriding
 joke and its implicit punch line become clear once the anonymous observer
 steps forward to introduce herself as Irene’s long-lost childhood friend and fel
­low “Negro,” Clare Kendry.
This early moment of revelation typifies Larsen’s narrative technique in
 
Passing, which often appears at pains to emphasize a dissonance between the
 “surface” layer of intersubjective encounter and its underlying substratum of
 “authentic” subjective experience. In this first passing encounter of Passing, it
 is the passer herself (Irene) who has succumbed
 
to the “absurd” set of racial/cor-  
poreal equations that usually lead “white people” to dupe themselves, and that
 have now led Irene herself to mistake Clare Kandry for a Caucasian. It 
is
 also,  
however, a critical moment for any approach to Larsen that seeks out Passings
 attitude toward racial substance, for after the renewal of acquaintances that
 takes place during this sequence, Irene find herself confronted with a vexed
 ontological question: in what sense, she now wonders, 
is
 Clare actually a
3
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"Negro,” especially when all of her visible, corporeal qualities — her "ivory” skin
 
and "golden hair,” for instance — seem to bespeak "whiteness,” so much so that
 Irene had never doubted Clare’s Caucasian status even throughout a close visu
­al scrutiny of her? Finding herself at a loss to explain precisely
 
how or why the  
phenotypically "Caucasian” Clare actually qualifies 
as
 "black,” Irene finally  
decides that the elusive moment of racial essence resides within the depths of
 Clare’s gaze: 
"Ah!
 Surely! They were Negro eyes! mysterious and concealing,”  
Irene concludes, but even here, the eyes of the Negro are not configured with
­in the anatomical geometries Irene considers little more than "silly rot” but are
 instead mystified, sublimated as that place from which racial difference, Clare’s
 secret inheritance from "her grandmother and later her mother and father,” the
 "thing that couldn’t be registered” in mere corporeal terms, somehow emanates
 (161).
It is also, therefore, a moment that places definite limits upon the subver
­
sive effects of parodic imitation, since it is the very seamlessness of Clare’s pass
­ing performance, the mimetic flawlessness of her simulation of a
 
white woman,  
that prompts Irene not to abandon "race” 
as
 a legitimate differential term but  
rather to re-locate it on a mysterious plane beyond that of the merely corpore
­al. Inasmuch as it locates a kernel of raw, unmediated racial alterity within the
 sanctum of Clare’s gaze, the sequence in the Drayton anticipates another mise-
 en-scene of performance and misrecognition, one that similarly pokes quiet fun
 at what Wiegman calls the "visible epistemology of black skin,” though this
 time, the butt of the joke appears in the form of Clare’s husband, the openly
 racist John Bellew. Larsen presents Bellew as the dupe, the racist fool who fails
 to realize that his own wife 
is
 among the very  "black scrimy devils” he impugns  
through his frequent diatribes. When asked to explain his apparently affec
­tionate pet name for his wife (usually, we discover, Bellew greets Clare as
 "Nig”), he offers Clare and Irene what he clearly considers a clever witticism.
 "When we were first married,” he explains, "she was as white as — as — well
 
as
 white as a lily. But I declare she’s gettin ' darker and darker. I tell her if she  
don’t look out, she’ll wake up one of these days and find she’s turned into a nig
­ger” (171). At this, of
 
course, Bellew "roar[s] with laughter,” and his laughter  
is reciprocated by the women surrounding him. But though it might appear to
 affirm Bellew’s bad joke, the laughter of Clare and Irene actually stems from a
 surreptitious comedic source, since both passing women are laughing at Bellew
 rather than with him, are laughing at the racist’s ridiculous blindness and truly
 laughable assumptions rather than alongside those assumptions. Availing
 themselves of that outlet Freud describes in Jokes and Their Relation to the
 Unconscious, Clare and Irene laugh as a way of
 
striking a blow at an adversary  
they are otherwise powerless to assail; Irene, Larsen tells us, "had a leaping
 desire to shout at the man beside her, And you’re sitting here surrounded by
 three black devils, drinking tea’” (172), but instead of denouncing Bellew open
­ly, Irene savors the hidden comedy through her unconcealed laughter.
So in a definite sense, Irene’s laughter during this sequence also qualifies as
 
a form of Butlerian, parodic laughter: part of the comedy to which her laugh
­ter responds lies in the fact that the ostensibly "Caucasian” women surrounding
 Bellew are in fact "copies,” the very "black scrimy devils” from which he imag
­
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ines himself safely distanced. But even if Irenes laughter finds its source in the
 
very forms of parody and imitation Butler describes in Gender Trouble, this
 laughter fails to deliver the liberating, denaturalizing effects Butler forecasts —
 quite the opposite, in fact. Larsens description of Irenes laughter draws it out,
 stretches it to conspicuous dimensions, so that while the laughter indicates 
a certain furtive pleasure with Bellew’s catastrophic mistake, the pleasure itself
 now appears 
as
 if situated along a Mobius strip, now verging upon its reversal  
into anguish: “Irene, who had been sitting with lips tightly compressed, cried
 out, ‘That’s good!’ and gave way to gales of laughter. She laughed and laughed
 and laughed. Tears ran down her cheeks. Her sides ached. Her throat hurt.
 She laughed on and on and on, long after the others had subsided” (171). It 
is while in the midst of this vertigo of laughter, Larsen tells us, that Irene, sud
­denly glancing into the eyes of Clare, “encountered her peculiar eyes fixed on
 her with an expression so dark and deep and unfathomable that she had for a
 short moment the sensation of gazing into the eyes of some creature utterly
 strange and apart” (172). Momentarily, Irene sees Clare as a
 
“creature,” a mon ­
ster of some kind, and in this sense, Irene sees Clare as Bellew sees all African
 Americans: even if not precisely as “black scrimy devils,” certainly as “unfath
­omable” and “utterly strange and apart.” As in the earlier sequence in the Dray
­ton, the gaze of Clare contains something “dark and deep,” something as
 “unfathomable” as race itself, the “thing that couldn’t be registered” otherwise.
So even if readers such as Kawash, Wiegman, and Butler are fundamental
­
ly correct when they suggest that Passing turns 
a
 suspicious eye toward tradi ­
tional notions of racial difference, and even if they are correct when they insist
 that the novel works to undermine those connections between corporeality and
 “race” that have most usually been taken for granted in American culture, why
 then do such moments from Passing seem to invest racial difference with a
 phantasmic power that perseveres despite the ontological deficiencies of “race
”
?  
The first contention I want to make here is that Passings paradoxical fixation
 with racial difference (ontologically bankrupt on the one hand yet irreducibly
 charged on the other) should remind us of what Jaques Lacan aims at in his
 deliberations over another category of difference — sexual difference — and
 especially in his insistence that sexual difference 
is
 real. By referring to sexual  
difference 
as
 real, Lacan does not mean that sexual difference pertains to some  
level of immutable, biologically fixed “reality” that stands apart from our dis
­cursive or epistemological renditions of sex but rather that sexual difference
 belongs to what he terms the order
 
of the real, precisely as that which cannot be  
enclosed in either the symbolic register (which 
is
 to say, in language itself) or  
what Lacan refers to as the imaginary (the visual world of corporeal images by
 means of which the subject may liken or differentiate herself from others).
 “Real,” for Lacan, 
is
 what perturbs both the imaginary and the symbolic, what  
exceeds the conceptual limits of either domain, and in Passing, racial difference
 — like sexual difference as described by Lacan — appears as “the essential
 object
 
which isn’t an object any longer, but this something faced  with which all  
words cease and all categories fail, the object of
 
anxiety par excellence” (Semi ­
nar II 164). Passing, in other words, denies racial difference both its symbolic
 and its imaginary support: in this novel, there is no phrase that can answer the
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question, "What is racial difference?” (we have seen, for instance, how a version
 
of this question leaves Irene Redfield with nothing meaningful to say), and nei
­ther does there seem to be any corporeal quality or set of qualities that can reli
­ably distinguish members of putatively distinct racial groups (all such efforts at
 the corporeal specification of race, 
as
 Irene rightly muses, are little more than  
"silly rot”). But the symbolic and imaginary bankruptcy of "race” as the term
 functions or dysfunctions in Passing should not lead us to conclude that Larsen
 dismisses the term 
as
 a mere social illusion — a mere "nothing” that twentieth ­
century subjects continue wrongly to invest 
as
 "something.” Instead, Larsens  
treatments of racial difference aim at its impossibly charged status, the sense in
 which racial difference, beyond the fact of its imaginary or symbolic deficien
­cies, 
is
 replete with its own real symptomatology. Another  way to put this is to  
say that regardless of Larsens purpose the effect of her narrative is to reverse
 the sort of historicist premise that informs so many approaches to her novel
 today: the point about Passing is not simply that racial difference is an histor
­ically contingent notion, that certain twentieth-century American subjects cre
­ated or inscribed racial difference for the purposes of post-reconstruction
 racism. The point, rather, is something like the opposite, that racial difference
 is in a way
 




 to suggest that the sort of antiracist cultural critique for which Wieg-  
man calls (and which she also enacts in sophisticated and illuminating ways),
 the fundamental aim of which is to interrupt the axis "between the idea of
 
‘race’  
and the ‘black’ body,” falls somewhat short of the challenge Larsen poses in
 Passing. For if the racist economies Larsen unveils persist even in the apparent
 absence of such a connection, this would imply that the cultural force of "race”
 is conceptually resistant to any critical
 
tactic that focuses strictly upon the dubi ­
ousness of its corporeal transfigurations.
What exactly 
is
 meant by "race” as the word is used and contested in Pass ­
ing? Responding to his wife’s self-assured remark ("What would it matter if
 ... I were one or two percent coloured?”), Bellew exclaims, "Oh, no, Nig. [. ..]
 Nothing like that with me. I know you’re no nigger, so it’s all right. You can
 get as black as you please as far as I’m concerned, since I know you’re no nig
­ger” (171). It is an intriguing formulation. Bellew’s statement would imply
 that "nigger” is something that is irreducible to a set of positive physical char
­acteristics, though these very characteristics are at the same time what demar
­cate whites from blacks. (Again: "I declare she’s gettin’ darker and darker. I
 tell her if she don’t look out, she’ll wake up one of these days and find she’s
 turned into a nigger.”) That is, one "can get as black as [one] please[s],” as far
 as Bellew is concerned, without actually qualifying as "black”; blackness thus
 designates a kind of uncanny surplus,
 
what is "in the subject more than the sub ­
ject itself,” to borrow
 
the Lacanian phrase; and in Passing, racial substance most  
often resides here, a kernel of alterity that exceeds the literal characteristics that
 designate alterity itself. If one may embody all of the physical qualities associ-
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ated with blackness without actually being black, this means that “black” 
is
 that  
which bypasses the level of imaginary identification (the level of specularizable
 difference by means of which one may liken or differentiate oneself), penetrat
­ing to the level of the real, the supposed inner stratum of the subject in his or
 her raw authenticity. So when Bellew explains that Clare may become as dark
­ly colored 
as
 she pleases without actually becoming “coloured,” the corollary of  
this logic is that one may appear as “Bly” white as whites themselves without
 actually
 
being  white. The matrix of corporeal qualities (skin, nose, hair, and so  
on) that ostensibly separates whites from blacks functions strictly as pretext
 here: what matters for the white-supremacist mentality that Bellew incarnates
 and Passing exposes is the phantasmic moment of difference that, since it can
 never be confined to a finite set of terms, can never be dispelled.
Such a prospect of an immaterial and yet substantial kernel of racial alteri
­
ty allows us to see how passing, far from undermining the apparently rigid sys
­tem of partitions that appears on the surface level of racist fantasy (in which the
 divisions that separate whites from blacks are presented as absolute and imper
­meable), actually provides the necessary exception that grounds the white
­supremacist logic. If, as Bellew believes, African Americans are not only the
 bearers of a particular class of physical characteristics but also the embodiment
 and source of a deep social malignancy (as he informs the passing women in his
 home, “I read in the papers about them. Always robbing and killing people”
 [172]),
 
what, may we imagine, would be Bellew’s response to an African Amer ­
ican who did not rob and kill? To Bellew’s paranoiac vision of “all blacks” as
 those who rob and kill, we may of
 
course add a list of traditional stereotypes:  
all blacks are lazy, all blacks are unintelligent, all blacks are possessed of an
 excessive sexual drive for which their unhappy social predicament may be
 blamed, and so on. The point here is that such lists are, like the physical char
­acteristics Clare may display without “really” being black, pure pretext; the log
­ical formulae, “Because they steal,” “Because they are lazy,” and “Because they
 cannot control their
 
urges” all serve to obscure the fundamental logic: “Because  
they are black
 
— because there is a universal something in them that overrides  
its own particular expression in theft, violence, or indigence.” If we are to
 imagine Bellew — or someone like Bellew — faced with a black subject who
 does not exhibit any of
 
these supposedly constant, particular qualities, we can  
also easily imagine how he would explain such a phenomenon without relin
­quishing his understanding of what blackness entails. His refrain would go
 something like this: “Do you see how clever they are? Here we have one who
 carefully refrains from criminal activity, who manages to keep his sexual urges
 in check, who has learned to sound intelligent. ... In short, here we have a
 black
 
who has learned to pass as white!”
It is this paradox of an exception to the universal law, the exception that
 rather than undermining actually grounds the law as universally effective, that
 Lacan articulated in his mathemes of sexual difference contained in the twen
­tieth seminar, Encore. If, as Lacan suggests, all subjects are subject to the uni
­versal condition of castration, this maxim nevertheless provides space for “at
 least one” subject that is not castrated (what Lacan calls the Name-of-the-
 Father, the master signifier against which all other signifiers appear as lacking
7
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or "castrated”), so that the universal rule requires some particular instance that
 
escapes its function.1 Intrinsic to the white-supremacist logic according to
 which "all blacks” are x, according to which all black subjects fall under the
 dominion of some universal rule or set of rules, is the
 
proviso that "some blacks”  
may not exhibit x traits; in order to maintain its epistemological footing in the
 face of clear evidence that many blacks are not the embodiment of x, the
 
white ­
supremacist mindset we are describing must have recourse to a conceptual
 frame within which "some blacks” may appear to escape the universal rule con
­cerning "all blacks” that defines white supremacy itself. The key point here is
 that passing in no way constitutes a threat to racist-essentialist thinking, not
 even insofar as it allegedly "deconstructs” the rigidly binarist logic of
 white/black; on the contrary, it is only through reference to the possibility of
 passing itself that racists can maintain their essentialist convictions in the face
 of black subjects who do not fit their paradigm of what "all blacks” must be.
Of definite interest here, moreover, is the way
 
in which this sleight of hand  
by means of which the prospect of racial essence is preserved, even once bereft
 of its imaginary or symbolic support, is played out within much of the criticism
 Larsen’s novel has generated over the past few decades. According to readers
 such as Cheryl Wall and Mary Mabel Youman, Passing presents a pair of
 women, Irene and Clare, who have paid for their upper-middle class existence
 by severing what Irene at one point refers to as "the bonds of race.” 1920s
 upper-middle-class affluence is thus diametrically opposed not only to solidar
­ity with other African Americans (Irene’s orchestration of tea parties for vari
­ous racial uplift organizations does in fact seem hypocritically distanced from
 actual political involvement) but also more troublingly to the self-acceptance of
 "blackness” itself. Even Deborah McDowell, whose pathbreaking work with
 the queer dimensions of Larsen’s narrative distinguishes itself from the more
 racially focused readings of other scholars, argues that Larsen "parodies the
 manners and morals of the black middle class” with her "descriptions of the
 endless tea and cocktail parties, and charity balls [that] capture the sterility and
 banality of the bourgeoisie” (xxv). The manners and morals at issue here are
 codified as "white” manners and morals, so that Irene’s comfortable lifestyle
 may
 
be treated as the index of her alienation — or, as McDowell puts it, of the  
problem of "racial identity and loyalty” raised by Irene’s genteel existence
 (xxvii).2 A sequence from Larsen’s 1928 novel Quicksand provides another case
 study for this tendency in Larsen scholarship. When the (also) mulatta, (also)
 bourgeois Helga Crane attends a Harlem cabaret in which, Larsen tells us, "the
 essence of life seemed bodily motion” (59), her involvement and fascination
 with the scene is somehow tinged with a sense of displacement, so that "when
 suddenly the music died, [Helga] dragged herself back to the present with 
a conscious effort; and a shameful certainty that not only had she been in the jun
­gle, but that she had enjoyed it, began to taunt her.” For Cheryl Wall, the
 severe sense of disjointedness to which Helga succumbs during this sequence
 comes about 
as
 a result of her close encounter with the ethnic Thing she strives  
to repress throughout the rest of the novel. For such readers, the repression of
 one’s own racial identity becomes the dominant leitmotif of Larsen’s work, as in
 Youman
'
s explanation that “Passing, in my opinion, is a novel  which shows that
8
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What deserves attention in such readings of Larsen, which formulate 
a
 sort  
of repressive hypothesis concerning upper-middle-class, African-American
 subjects who appear detached from the set of desires that are even today often
 taken as somehow fundamental to the "authentic” African-American subjective
 experience, is the supposition these readings necessarily
 
entail: strictly by virtue  
of their racial status — albeit a racial status that is comprised neither by "black”
 physical characteristics (since these are a priori ""invisible” in passing novels) nor
 allegedly ""black” proclivities (since it is the absence of
 
such proclivities that is 
itself remarked upon as conspicuous) — African-American subjects are by def
­inition "out of joint” within the staid milieu of the bourgeoisie. This supposi
­tion carries with it an implicit injunction: in order to ""be black” (that is, in
 order to show solidarity with other African Americans, in order to attain the
 ideal of self-realization, in order to be ""comfortable with who I am,” and so on),
 African-American subjects must not only make certain choices (for instance,
 they must choose the cabaret over the tea-party), they must also go the further
 step of actually enjoying the "correct” choice. It is not enough simply to go
 through one
'
s social ritual in a mechanical, dutiful fashion, since one may  
attend the cabaret without really embracing it; rather, one must take the addi
­tional step of actually, "really” preferring
 
this cultural ritual over  that one. If one  
cannot make this psychic turn — if, in spite of going through all of the outward
 motions that should signal one’s willingness to embrace some sense of ethnic
 belonging, one 
is
 nevertheless unable to close one’s sense of distance — this  
failure points to the fact that one 
is
 "still passing”; the inability to enjoy  the rit ­
ual wholeheartedly is indicative of a fundamental betrayal.3
It should come as no surprise that this formula for racial essentialism, one
 
that draws explicitly upon wider suppositions about the modes of pleasure and
 preference proper to racially distinct individuals, extends beyond Larsen’s work
 to infiltrate many levels of contemporary culture. Perhaps the most striking
 recent instance of the demand that African Americans organize their desires in
 particular ways appears as the central trope of George Tillman’s 1997 film Soul
 Food, where ethnic cuisine 
is
 used as the fundamental test of the subject’s self ­
acceptance. The particular pairing of words that makes up this film’s title is of
 course related to the Lacanian motif of sublimation, whereby a random, arbi
­trary object ("food”) is elevated to the status of the formless, ineffable Thing
 that is the subject as such ("soul”). That is, the degree to which one loves one
­self and one’s family 
as
 African American is precisely commensurate, in Till ­
man’s film, with one’s desire for "soul food”; only by renouncing other culinary
 styles, or at least subordinating one’s taste for these styles, can the subject prove
 his or her solidarity and self-acceptance. Another version of this problematic
 is well-known to African-American literary scholars who choose to specialize
 in, for example, Victorian or Chaucerian Studies 
as
 opposed to (again for  
instance) the nineteenth-century slave narrative or postcolonial theory. Often
 such scholars may be regarded as unusual exceptions to the universal rule that
 all black scholars are postcolonial theorists of the slave narrative, so that the
 very existence of such individuals seems to betray a form of deep "identity
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struggle” on their behalf: does not the very fact that here is an African-Amer
­
ican intellectual who does not show any interest in such areas of inquiry point
 to the fact that this individual has already been interpellated into the white
­supremacist mindset that privileges George Eliot over Harriet Jacobs? Does
 not the fact that this individual has failed not only to choose Jacobs over Eliot
 but to do so freely, to prefer wholeheartedly Jacobs to Eliot, indicate the sad
 truth that this individual is really ‘passing” — not only to other academics but,
 more tragically, to him- or herself?
3.
So — to return to our earlier concern — while Butler’s tendency is to invest
 
pleasure, and especially the sort of spontaneous pleasure she associates with par
­odic laughter, 
as
 a form of unregulated affect that provides our surest resistance  
against the normative prescriptions of race, gender, and so on, I
 
would point out  
that in many cases, the very “authentic” pleasure of the subject who would resist
 his or her normative, paradigmatic role is already the projection par excellence
 of this role, already well within the horizon of the normative paradigm to which
 this subject is already submitted. On the view I offer, we cannot extract the
 subject in his or her authenticity through reference to this subject’s apparently
 genuine experience of pleasure because even at this innermost level of the sub
­ject’s self-experience, the subject’s psychic interiority is already co-opted and
 reduced by external socio-symbolic forces. This, moreover, is what Lacan aims
 at with his insistence that “Desire is desire of the Other” (Seminar XI
 
235): the  
same internal, private desire to which we might appeal in order to extract the
 subject from his or her suffocating, publicly induced, socio-symbolic role 
is
 in  
fact already the extenuation of this role, such that the opposition of surface and
 depth that seems to inform so much of the criticism Passing generates finally
 becomes impossible to maintain.
This is to say that the public level of socio-symbolic exchange and
 
encounter intrudes upon the psychic interiority of the subject of Passing, and to
 such an extent that this intrusion provides the fundamental scheme for the
 novel’s narrative process. Toward the end of Passing, the collapse of boundaries
 between private desire and public happenstance follows a pattern of wish-ful
­fillment, wherein Irene’s internal drives are realized through the activities of
 others, actuated in the public space — but apparently without her explicit con
­sent. After arriving at the conclusion that Clare has been carrying on an affair
 with Irene’s husband, Brian, Irene suddenly realizes “how easily she could put
 Clare out of her fife! She had only to tell John Bellew — No. Not that!” If
 Bellew were to stumble upon the fact that Clare is in fact a passing “Negro,”
 Irene concludes, “[i]t would be enough to rid her forever of Clare Kendry”
 (225). Irene, however, immediately abandons this plan, unable to muster the
 resolve necessary to inform Bellew of Clare’s secret
 
identity — but sure enough,  
“[a]s if in answer to her wish,” Larsen tells us, the very next scene of Passing
 brings Irene face to face with John Bellew, whom she meets in a chance
 encounter on the streets of downtown Manhattan. During this second meet
­
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ing with Bellew, Irene is literally “linked,” arm in arm, with her friend Felise
 
Freeland, an African American whose skin 
is
 too dark to allow her to pass, and  
so Irene does not have to say a word in order for Bellew to conclude that his
 wife, as well as Irene Redfield, consorts with “Negroes” and hence (according to
 the string of associations that apparently structures Bellew’s logic) may well be
 black herself.
Since her earlier hopes are now reached through an unplanned encounter,
 
and further, since they are realized not by Irene herself but chiefly by virtue of
the paranoid associations of Bellew (who apparently
 
believes that mere contact  
with African Americans indicates one’s identification with African Americans),
 Irene is spared having to confront the fact that she herself has been psychically
 complicit in this disclosure of Clare’s secret; she 
is
 able, in other words, to dis ­
avow her own previous desire for such a meeting with Bellew, since she herself
 did nothing to orchestrate this meeting. The denouement of Passing, moreover,
 follows a similar trajectory of disavowal and wish-fulfillment. After realizing
 that Bellew’s discovery of Clare’s identity will probably cause him simply to
 divorce his
 
wife (as in the contemporaneous case of “Kip” Rhinelander, who  was  
granted a divorce in New York State after the revelation of his wife’s African-
 American status) and hence free the latter to pursue a relationship with Brian,
 Irene now concludes she would be happiest if Clare would simply die. Once
 again, Irene immediately represses this traumatic wish (“Oh, it was vile!” she
 thinks, “To think, yes, to wish that!” [228]), and once again, the disavowal of
 the wish immediately precedes the wish’s chance realization; in the closing
 pages of the novel, Clare falls from a sixth-story window, apparently in response
 to her husband’s denunciation of her as “a nigger, a damned dirty nigger!”
 (238).4
All of this is not simply intended as an digression into the question of
 
Irene’s level of responsibility for Clare’s social and literal downfall, for the ques
­tions of accountability at play in both of these mysterious sequences finally
 intersect with the problems of identity and agency intrinsic to passing itself.
 Who, after all, passes in Passing? When Clare or Irene passes, she never does
 so by means of a direct proclamation of whiteness; rather, it is the network of
 communally held, socially circulated assumptions, assumptions grounded in a
 model of Caucasian normativity, that does the passing for both women, that
 generates the fiction that each woman then only inhabits — into which she
 simply passes. Is passing equivalent to lying? If so, it is the sort of
 
lie from  
which the subject retains a definite distance, a “lie” that initiates and sustains
 itself quite apart from the passing subject’s overt efforts at deception. In this
 sense, passing 
is
 of a piece with the sort of lie at issue in Freud’s famous joke  
concerning the two Jews — First Jew: “I’m going to Cracow.” Second Jew:
 “Liar! Why do you tell me you’re going to Cracow so that I’ll think you’re
 going to Lvov? You, in fact, are going to Cracow!” (Jokes 115; see also Lacan,
 Écrits 173).
The lesson Lacan extrapolates from Freud’s joke 
is
 that while many animals  
can deceive, human beings are the animals that can lie by telling the truth, who
 can formulate “lies” strictly in light of the Other’s unwillingness to see the truth
 even and perhaps especially when it 
is
 hidden in plain sight. Larsen’s acute
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understanding of the logic behind Freud’s joke imbues every page of Passing,
 
where passing mainly occurs at the level of the Other’s myopic failure to see
 blackness except as an aberration of norms. It is in the spirit of this joke, more
­over, that Larsen invites us to laugh alongside Irene and Clare as the latter asks
 her husband, “My goodness, Jack! What difference would it make if, after all
 these years, you were to find out that I was one or two percent coloured?”
To speak of this dynamic 
as
 a form of subversive performance obscures the  
sense in which passing only acquires its performative status against the back-
 drop of primarily repressive presuppositions and prerogatives; the day-to-day
 activities of a subject only become a form of passing once enclosed within a
 conceptual space that overdetermines these activities as inherently transgres
­sive. This 
is
 why Irene, who later admits to occasional passing “for the sake of  
convenience” (227) and whom we witness in the act of passing on at least two
 occasions, nevertheless distances herself from the act itself. “Tell me, honest
­ly,” Clare asks, “haven’t you ever thought of passing’?” Irene responds, “No.
 Why should I?” (160). Irene’s response does not, as we might initially think,
 twist the truth so very far indeed, since one need not premeditate or even think
 of one’s own passing in order actually to pass; passing, rather, occurs by its own
 volition, is already underway prior to the passing subject’s apprehension. “It’s
 funny about passing,”’ Irene later comments. “We disapprove of it and at the
 same time condone it. It excites our contempt and
 
yet we rather admire it. We  
shy away from it with an odd kind of revulsion, but we protect it” (186). Like
 racial difference itself, passing extends from a point beyond the words the sub
­ject speaks, prior to the images he or she embodies, emerges from a place past
 the reaches of these considerations, where contempt, revulsion, and fascination




See Lacan, Seminar XX  78-80: “through the phallic function . . . man  
as a whole acquires his inscription, with the proviso that this function is limit
­ed due to the existence of an x by means of which the function Φx [Lacan’s
 matheme for castration] is negated” (79).
2.
 
Other readers who follow the trajectory I describe here, by means of  
which Irene and/or Clare are viewed 
as
 subjects who actively efface some extant  
dimension of racial/ethnic “identity” through the cultural alignments they
 assume, include Davis, whose critical biography of Larsen explains that Irene’s
 attraction for Clare should be read 
as
 an “aesthetic attraction to whiteness” that  
we should understand as a “logical extension of her bourgeoisie lifestyle and
 ideology” (306), and Sullivan, who contends that “Irene passes’ not by adopt
­ing a white identity 
as
 Clare does, but by adopting white values, including  
white standards of beauty” (374). Last, I might mention that by interrogating
 the formal logic these readings seem to embrace, I do not mean to deny the
 possibility that Irene is indeed invested in some form of racial distancing
 throughout Passing. Rather, what I am trying to underline here is simply that
 signifiers of affluence and blackness need not exist in an antithetical relation
­ship.
12





The implicit injunction at issue here is thus a version of  what Lacan  
refers to as the superegoic demand. As Lacan stressed over and over again,
 superego and law are not equivalent, since while the law insists that the subject
 must curtail his or her enjoyment (and thus tacitly incites transgression), the
 superego issues the very opposite commandment: “Enjoy!” Superego, Lacan
 explains, emerges out of the blind spots of the law, the places at which “the law
 is entirely reduced to something, which cannot even be expressed, like the You
 must, which is speech deprived of all its meaning” (Seminar I 102). In the con
­ceptual framework of Larsen
'
s novels, we can see how the superegotistical  
injunction to enjoy can be infinitely more oppressive than mere prohibition.
 How, after all, can the subject obey such a demand? Often, he or she simply
 cannot; for Helga Crane, who cannot unproblematically enjoy herself at the
 cabaret, the failure to respond correctly to stimuli that “should” (according to
 readers such as Wall and Youman) provide pleasure and satisfaction produces a
 very particular, poisonous form of guilt, the guilt of a subject
 
whose very  failure  
to enjoy must indicate a deeper loathing of the values that supposedly comprise
 his or her core being as subject. On the superegotistical injunction to enjoy, see
 Lacan, Ecrits 256. For more detailed analyses of the split between law and
 superego, see Žižek, Metastases 54-85 and Plague 113-7.
4.
 
Almost all Larsen scholars have focused upon this final sequence in an  
attempt to solve the plot-level mystery it seems to present. Irene herself, after
 all, 
is
 standing closest to Clare when the latter falls, and so the narrative raises  
the possibility that Irene, and not Bellew or Clare herself, is the actual agent
 behind this catastrophe. Indeed, Irene herself appears on the verge of such a
 conclusion in the novel’s final moments; apparently suffering from a form of
 amnesia as she tries to sort through the events immediately prior to Clare’s
 death, Irene nevertheless recalls “the image of her hand on Irene’s arm” (239),
 a memory that costs her the realization that she herself may have pushed Clare
 from the open window. But since the novel simply does not supply its reader
 with the factual information required to reach this conclusion, it is helpful here
 to refer, once again, to Lacan’s distinction
 
between reality and the real. Accord ­
ing to Lacan, even when a husband who suffers from the delusion that his wife
 
is
 unfaithful discovers that his wife has indeed been carrying on a series of  
affairs, the reality of his wife’s indiscretions in no way changes the fact that the
 husband is a paranoid delusional. In such an instance, Lacan tells us, “reality”
 renders itself as 
a
 projection or symptom of the real, the real as condensed in  
the husband’s paranoid delusions of his cheating wife (which, we can well
 imagine, would persist even if his wife were utterly faithful). For this reason,
 Lacan stipulates in his eleventh seminar that “the unconscious is outside”; the
 unconscious, in other words, does not end at the periphery of internal, purely
 psychic associations and fixations. Rather, it is bound up with the material
 
real ­
ity of the world that surrounds us, infiltrating the sphere of social relations
 itself. Mutatis mutandis, our final assessments of Irene’s role during this scene
 should not depend upon whether or not she herself actually pushes Clare from
 the sixth-story
 
window, for the fact is that, whoever initiated Clare’s fall, Irene  
herself is responsible for having desired this fall; the entire sequence, like the
 earlier sequence during which Bellew accidentally discovers his wife’s African-
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American status, should be read as the public rendition of Irene’s private
 
desires, and hence as an illustration of reality’s symptomatic relation to the real.
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